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Abstract 
Chinese parents prefer to have sons as they depend on their sons for support in old age, 
according to most of the literature. This paper uses the Preference Parameters Study, 
which randomly interviewed individuals in six major cities in China in 2011, to present 
empirical evidence about the possible cause of the problematic gender imbalance at 
birth in China. From the dataset, this paper compares sons’ and daughters’ commitment 
to parental care from a selection of respondents who were married, aged 20-70, had at 
least one living parent, and had no missing answers to the interview questions. The 
results indicate that Chinese sons (and their wives) are more likely, compared to 
daughters (and their husbands), to be primary caregivers for parents. Nonetheless, 
parents’ dependency on their children would not necessarily decrease with social 
security, although children with highly educated spouses appear to present an exception. 
The current study supports the initial claim found in literature; however, the solution to 
the gender imbalance at birth in China may not be the development of a social security 
system. 
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Introduction 
Does the anxiety about old age cause the gender imbalance in China? 
Chinese parents prefer to have sons as they depend on their sons for support 
in old age, mainly because of the absence of well-functioning social insurance 
programs (Chan, Yip, Ng et al., 2002; Chen, Li, & Meng, 2012; and Wei & 
Zhang, 2011). There is, however, no empirical evidence that a) Chinese sons 
take care of their parents more than daughters do, or b) the development of 
social security would ease the gender imbalance at birth. This research first 
tests the hypothesis that Chinese sons take care of their parents more than 
Chinese daughters do by investigating Chinese household survey data, and 
then considers whether the development of social security would solve the 
problematic gender imbalance in China. 
 
Traditionally, Chinese parents have preferred boys and the population of 
China reflects a significant gender imbalance that favors males (Coale, 1991). 
As reported in censuses, gender imbalance (male to female) at birth rose 
from 1.076 in 1982 to 1.223 in 2008 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2010). Sex selective abortion that has become possible due to modern science 
has accelerated such gender imbalance (Chen, Li, & Meng, 2012). Hesketh 
and Xing (2006) pointed out that the abnormal gender ratio in the population 
may cause social problems in the future, increasing levels of violence as 
many young males fail to find partners. 
 
Much of the literature considers parents’ anxieties about old age as a major 
reason for Chinese parents preferring boys. Traditionally, the Chinese 
believe that once daughters are married, they belong to their husbands and 
their husbands’ families; thus, daughters’ families-of-origin, especially their 
parents, rely heavily on their sons and daughters-in-law for security in old 
age (Chan, Yip, Ng et al., 2002; Chen, Li, & Meng, 2012; and Wei & Zhang, 
2011). Recently, due to the government’s one-child policy, most parents can 
have only one child. If the only child is a girl, her parents have no one to care 
for them in old age. Therefore, families place strong preference on male 
offspring.   
 
There are some poorly supported, yet possible, rebuttals. First, one may 
claim that the male preference in China is a part of its traditional culture, 
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not stemming just from the need for long-term care, but such traditional 
culture is not unique to China. Ancient Chinese, Egyptian, and Greek 
civilizations, for example, shared some practices and manipulations that 
they claimed to be effective in influencing the gender of a child before its 
birth (Chan, Yip, Ng et al., 2002). Such a male preference culture remains in 
today’s world, to some extent due to the notion of “inheriting family history.” 
In most countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, France, the 
United States, Japan, and Korea, children usually carry their fathers’ family 
names, not their mothers’. Yet, such male preference tradition does not affect 
the gender balance in most countries. Table 1 indicates the gender balance at 
birth by selected countries. Although the notion of “inheriting family history” 
is to some extent common in these countries, there is no other country that 
loses the gender balance as much as China.   
 
Table 1: Gender-balance at birth and total fertility rate in selected countries 
Source: For Gender-balance, World Bank (2012). For total fertility rate, 
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2012). 
 
Second, one may think male preference results from China’s introduction of 
its unique one-child policy, but the effect may be limited. Certainly, parents 
in China tend to be more selective on the gender of their child because they 
often have no second chance. Nonetheless, many parents in other countries, 
such as Germany, Japan, and Korea, cannot afford a second child either, due 
to socio-economic circumstances. Evidently, the total fertility rate of these 
countries indicates much less than two, yet these countries do not lose their 
 Gender-balance (Male 
to Female) at birth 
(2005-2010) 
Total fertility rate 
(2010) 
China 1.19 - 
United Kingdom 1.05 2.00 
Germany 1.06 1.39 
France 1.05 2.01 
United States 1.05 1.93 
Japan 1.06 1.39 
Korea, Republic of 1.10 1.23 
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gender balance at birth to the extent that China does. 
 
A major difference between China and the others lies in the level of 
dependency on the son in old age: Chinese social security is very weak. Table 
2 indicates workers’ pension participation rates in selected countries. While 
the pension coverage rate is only 20 percent in China, the overages in most 
other countries are about 90 percent. Korea appears to be an exception, but 
the coverage is still more than double that in China. In addition, Table 3 
shows that China has not yet developed the long-term care policies that 
other nations have already prepared. As the literature claims, therefore, 
Chinese parents most likely prefer boys because of the absence of a 
well-functioning social security system. 
 
Table 2: Worker’s Pension Program Participation Rates in Selected Countries 
 China UK Germany France US Japan Korea 
Worker’s 
Participation 
Rate 
20.7% 92.3% 87.6% 87.9% 92.1% 95.2% 49.5% 
Remarks Still under 
development 
Compulsory 
participation 
for employees 
and 
self-employed 
individuals 
Compulsory 
participation 
for employees 
and some 
types of 
self-employed 
individuals 
Compulsory 
participation 
for employees 
and 
self-employed 
individuals 
Compulsory 
participation 
for employees 
and 
self-employed 
individuals 
Universal 
coverage 
Universal 
coverage 
Source: OECD (2007). 
 
Table 3: Major Public Long-Term Care Programs Selected Countries 
 China UK Germany France US Japan Korea 
Major Public 
Long-Term 
Care 
Program 
Under- 
development
Social services/ 
Social Security 
Benefits 
(Means-Tested) 
Social 
Long-Term 
Care 
Insurance 
(Universal) 
APA 
(Universal) 
Medicaid 
(Means-tested)
Long-Term 
Care 
Insurance 
(Universal) 
Long-Term 
Care 
Insurance 
(Universal) 
Source: OECD (2005) and Colombo F., Llena-Nazal A., Mercier J., & Tjadens 
F. (2011). 
 
The solution drawn from literature is that the development of the social 
security eases the gender-imbalance at birth in China. With well-functioning 
the social security, Chinese parents would become less dependent on their 
son. Many of them would not make “efforts” to choose to have a son. 
Consequently, the gender imbalance would be eased. 
 
However, the argument has a critical weakness. The logic, based on the 
traditional assumption that Chinese sons take care of their parents more 
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than Chinese daughters do, has no empirical evidence to support it. Most 
literature related to the gender imbalance issue builds arguments based on 
the assumption that Chinese sons provide better long-term care for parents. 
If the assumption were wrong, the cause of the gender imbalance in China 
would be unrelated to parental anxiety about old age. The conclusion, and 
the assumed solution, therefore, would address the wrong cause. In addition, 
even if the traditional assumption were correct in the past, there is no 
guarantee it is still right today. Some literature disagrees with the 
traditional assumption due to the recent transitions in the socio-economic 
environment. Davis (1993) and Zhan & Montgomery (2003) claim a recent 
change of the gender role in elder care. Cooney & Di (1999) report an 
increase in the number of parents cared for by daughters in the Shanghai 
area as opposed to daughters-in-law and sons. The basic assumption in 
gender imbalance issues in China now strongly requires national 
verification. 
 
The primary purpose of this paper is to address the absence of empirical 
evidence. Testing the assumption that Chinese sons take care of their 
parents more than Chinese daughters do, this research proposes a basis for 
the cause of the gender imbalance issue in China and a possible solution to 
the issue. 
 
Data 
The data used in this research were from Osaka University’s “Preference Parameters 
Study in China 2011.” The study conducted face-to-face interviews of individuals and 
households in six major cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, 
Wuhan, and Shenyang, from December 23, 2010 to January 21, 2011. The target 
respondents were adults aged 20 to 70 years old. The sampling applied Multistage 
Sampling and Allocation Methods. The study first set predicted numbers of responses 
based on the target population in each district using the Statistical Yearbook. Then, the 
study randomly selected an area in each district. Finally, the study chose the interviewed 
individuals from families using the Kish Grid method. From the data set, the current 
research chose 454 observations who were married, had at least one living parent, and 
had no missing answers.  
 
Collected in major Chinese cities only, the data unfortunately do not represent the entire 
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nation of China. Representing the population of the six major cities, however, the 
dataset includes a significant part of the country. As mentioned earlier, Cooney & Di 
(1999), who compared the number of parents cared for by sons and daughters, 
used data from Shanghai only. The current research, therefore, also 
contributes to a better understanding of the hypothesis that Chinese sons 
take care of their parents more than Chinese daughters do. 
 
Results 
Simple Observation 
The primary question asked for this research was the following: Who will be 
the primary caregiver for your own father/mother when he/she needs 
long-term care? The choices were 1) you (respondent), 2) your spouse, 3) your 
brother/sister or your spouse’s brother/sister, 4) the spouse of the parent 
requiring care, 5) other family member, 6) nursing home or assisted living 
home, 7) home-helper, or 8) other. The respondent was required to make only 
one choice for each parent. Table 4 indicates the answers. The responses for 
fathers and mothers are uneven because some respondents had only one 
living parent. 
 
The answers to the question have four implications for parent-child 
relationships in the context of long-term care in China. First, Chinese 
parents are heavily dependent on their children for their long-term care. The 
answer choices from 1 to 3 indicate a child(ren), including a child(ren)’s 
spouse(s), primarily providing care for the parent(s). The sub-total of the 
total category in Table 4 shows that 90 percent of parents are dependent on 
their child(ren) for required care.  
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Table 4: Primary Care Giver for Parents According to the Respondent’s Gender 
 Respondent= Male (Son) Respondent= Female (Daughter) Total 
Own 
Father 
Own 
Mother 
Sub-total Own 
Father 
Own 
Mother 
Sub-total Own 
Father 
Own 
Mother 
Sub-total 
1 You 
(=Respondent) 
111 
(64.91%) 
109 
(60.89%) 
220 
(62.86%) 
96 
(56.16%) 
98 
(56.98%) 
194 
(56.56%) 
207 
(60.53%) 
207 
(58.97%) 
414 
(59.74%) 
2 Your spouse 25 
(14.62%) 
34 
(18.99%) 
59 
(16.86%) 
13 
(7.6%) 
9 
(5.23%) 
22 
(6.41%) 
38 
(11.11%) 
43 
(12.25%) 
81 
(11.69%) 
3 Your 
brother/sister or 
your spouse’s 
brother/sister 
20 
(11.70%) 
21 
(11.73%) 
41 
(11.71%) 
42 
(24.56%) 
46 
(26.74%) 
88 
(25.66%) 
62 
(18.13%) 
67 
(19.09%) 
129 
(18.61%) 
4 The spouse of the 
parent requiring 
care 
2 
(1.17%) 
4 
(2.23%) 
6 
(1.71%) 
3 
(1.75%) 
2 
(1.16%) 
5 
(1.46%) 
5 
(1.46%) 
6 
(1.71%) 
11 
(1.59%) 
5 Other family 
member 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
2 
(1.17%) 
1 
(0.58%) 
3 
(0.87%) 
2 
(0.58%) 
1 
(0.28%) 
3 
(0.43%) 
6 Nursing 
home/assisted 
living home 
7 
(4.09%) 
5 
(2.79%) 
12 
(3.43%) 
2 
(1.17%) 
2 
(1.16%) 
4 
(1.17%) 
9 
(2.63%) 
7 
(1.99%) 
16 
(2.31%) 
7 Home helper 6 
(3.51%) 
6 
(2.79%) 
12 
(3.43%) 
12 
(7.02%) 
13 
(7.56%) 
25 
(7.29%) 
18 
(5.26%) 
19 
(5.41%) 
26 
(5.34%) 
8 Other 0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(0.58%) 
1 
(0.58%) 
2 
(0.58%) 
1 
(0.29%) 
1 
(0.28%) 
1 
(0.29%) 
Total 171 
(100%) 
179 
(100%) 
350 
(100%) 
171 
(100%) 
172 
(100%) 
343 
(100%) 
342 
(100%) 
351 
(100%) 
693 
(100%) 
 
Second, Chinese parents seem to be more dependent on their sons. Choice 1 
for male respondents (sons) occupies more than 60 percent, whereas that of 
female respondents (daughters) is about 56 percent. Including choice 2, 
which is the respondent’s spouse, the dependency on sons increases to nearly 
80 percent, whereas that on daughters is only about 63 percent. As predicted 
in the literature, Chinese parents rely on their sons and daughters-in-law for 
long-term care. 
 
Third, parents that have daughters may have difficulties finding caregivers 
in the future. The female respondents in this research expect their siblings 
or the siblings’ spouses to provide long-term care for their parents. In fact, 
almost 25 percent of female respondents chose choice 3, which is more than 
double the 11.7 percent of male respondents who made this choice. However, 
choice 3 is possible only when female respondents have siblings. As 
mentioned earlier, the Chinese government introduced the one-child policy in 
1979. Targeting those aged 20-69 years old, this research included many 
respondents born prior to 1979. It is clear, however, that younger generations 
will not often have siblings and the parents that have daughters will suffer 
more than those who have sons.  
 
Fourth, it is unknown from the results if the development of social security 
would ease the sons’ preference. As seen earlier, the parents that have 
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daughters rely more on their other children, not necessarily on professional 
care, indicated by choices 6 and 7. As choice 3 may become unlikely due to 
the one-child policy, many parents who do not have sons may have to rely on 
professional care in the future, which usually requires a decent social 
security income. However, the results produced no such evidence. 
 
One must consider that the implications above may be biased. Table 4 simply 
arranges the answers from the respondents, according to their gender. In 
reality, the respondents’ attributes, such as age, income, educational 
background, and sibling status, may also influence the answer. The research 
needs a further investigation, controlling for these factors. 
 
Controlled Observations 
This section uses 5 explained and 10 explaining variables as seen in Table 5. 
Among them, the years of education of one’s own/spouse’s father and mother 
(5-8 in explaining variables) is a proxy variable for joining a pension program, 
which allows parents to be more independent from their children. As seen in 
Table 2, workers’ pension participation rate in China is only 20.7 percent. 
The observations assume that higher education provides a better chance of 
participating in a pension program.  
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Table 5: Variables and Description 
Variable Description 
(Explained)  
(1) I_care_own (dummy) Who will be the primary caregiver for your own parent(s) when 
he/she (they) needs long‐term care? (1 = respondent, 0 = others) 
(2) I_care_spouse (dummy) Who will be the primary caregiver for your spouse’s parent(s) 
when he/she (they) needs long‐term care? (1 = respondent, 0 = 
others) 
(3) Couple_care_own 
(dummy)   
Who will be the primary caregiver for your own parent(s) when 
he/she (they) needs long‐term care? (1= respondent or 
respondent’s spouse, 0 = others) 
(4) Couple_care_spouse 
(dummy) 
Who will be the primary caregiver for your spouse’s parent(s) 
when he/she (they) needs long‐term care? (1 = respondent or 
respondent’s spouse, 0 = others) 
(5) 
Professiornal_care_own 
(dummy) 
Who will be the primary caregiver for your own parent(s) when 
he/she (they) needs long‐term care? (1= Nursing home/Assisted 
living home/Home helper, 0 = others) 
(Explaining)  
1. Male_dummy 1= male, 0 = female 
2. Age Age 
3. Education Years of Education 
4. E_spouse Spouse’s “Years of Education” 
5. E_father Father’s “Years of Education” 
6. E_mother Mother’s “Years of Education” 
7. E_spouse_father Spouse’s father’s “Years of Education”
8. E_spouse_mother Spouse’s mother’s “Years of Education”
9. Income Respondent’s household income (yearly) 
10. One_child_dummy 1 = no siblings, 0 = have sibling(s) 
 
Having five explained variables, this section has five estimation models: 
 
(1) Prob (I_care_own = 1) = a + b (Male_dummy) + c (Age) + d (Education) + e 
(Income) + f (One_child_dummy) + g*X (X: other explanatory variables) 
 
If the hypothesis were right, sons would be more involved in parental care. 
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Thus, the impact of Male_dummy would be positive. By contrast, if the 
hypothesis were wrong, daughters would be more involved in parental care. 
Thus, the impact of Male_dummy would be negative. 
 
(2) Prob (I_care_spouse = 1) = a + b (Male_dummy) + c (Age) + d (Education) 
+ e (Income) + f (One_child_dummy) + g*X (X: other explanatory 
variables) 
 
This is the opposite of model (1). If the hypothesis were right, daughters 
would be more involved in the care for their spouses’ parents. Thus, the 
impact of Male_dummy would be negative. By contrast, if the hypothesis 
were wrong, sons would be more involved in the care for their spouses’ 
parents. Thus, the impact of Male_dummy would be positive. 
 
(3) Prob (Couple_care_own = 1) = a + b (Male_dummy) + c (Age) + d 
(Education) + e (Income) + f (One_child_dummy) + g*X (X: other 
explanatory variables) 
 
If the hypothesis were right, sons and their wives would be more involved in 
parental care. Thus, the impact of Male_dummy would be positive. By 
contrast, if the hypothesis were wrong, daughters would be more involved in 
parental care. Thus, the impact of Male_dummy would be negative. 
 
(4) Prob (Couple_care_spouse = 1) = a + b (Male_dummy) + c (Age) + d 
(Education) + e (Income) + f (One_child_dummy) + g*X (X: other 
explanatory variables) 
 
Again, this is the opposite of model (3). 
 
(5) Prob (Professional_care_own = 1) = a + b (Male_dummy) + c (Age) + d 
(Education) + e (Income) + f (One_child_dummy) + g*X (X: other 
explanatory variables) 
 
If the hypothesis were right, the parents with pension programs would rely 
more on professional services. Since parents’ dependency on their children 
causes the gender imbalance in China, the development of a social security 
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system would decrease that dependency. As a result, Chinese gender 
imbalance at birth would be eased. Therefore, the impact of E_father and 
E_mother would be positive. Otherwise, the results would not support the 
logic drawn from the literature.  
 
Table 6 depicts the descriptive statistics for the variable used in this analysis. 
Almost exactly half of the observations are male. Education ranges from a 
minimum of 3 years to the 16 years of a PhD candidature. As the average age 
of the respondents making the observations is 47.6 years old, many of them 
were born prior to 1979. As a result, only 13 percent of them are single 
children (no siblings).  
 
  Table 6: Descriptive Statistics 
(Explained) Mean Sd Max Min Obs 
(1) I_care_own (dummy) 0.515 0.500 1 0 454 
(2) I_care_spouse (dummy) 0.205 0.404 1 0 454 
(3) Couple_care_own 
(dummy) 
0.586 0.493 1 0 454 
(4) Couple_care_spouse 
(dummy) 
0.564 0.496 1 0 454 
(5) Professiornal_care_own 
(dummy) 
0.062 0.241 1 0 454 
(Explaining)      
1. Male_dummy 0.509 0.500 1 0 454 
2. Age 47.218 11.316 70 24 454 
3. Education 10.846 2.747 16 3 454 
4. E_spouse 10.652 2.739 16 3 454 
5. E_father 7.337 2.460 16 3 454 
6. E_mother 6.828 2.465 16 3 454 
7. E_spouse_father 7.073 2.463 16 3 454 
8. E_spouse_mother 6.670 2.424 16 3 454 
9. Income 5158.590 6012.691 90300 1400 454 
10. One_child_dummy 0.143 0.351 1 0 454 
 
Table 7 summarizes the estimation results. Model 1 and Model 3 show that 
Male_dummy is positive and significant. Model 2 indicates that 
Male_dummy is negative and significant. In Model 4, Male dummy is also 
negative, but not significant. Overall, the results support the hypothesis. 
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Table 7: Estimation Results 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Throughout Model 1 to 4, age is negative and significant. That is, the older 
the child, the less he/she is involved in a parent’s care. As the average age of 
the respondents is over 47 years old, this is probably because older children 
cannot physically afford to serve as primary caregivers for their parents. 
 
Contrary to the hypothesis, Model 5 shows that both E_father and E_mother 
do not substantially influence the reliance on the use of professional care. 
This may mean that social security does not necessarily decrease parents’ 
dependency on their children. Thus, the results do not support the 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 I_care_own I_care_spouse Couple_care_own Couple_care_spouse Professional_care_
own 
Male_dummy 0.286* -0.240 0.435*** -0.0724 -0.140 
 (2.28) (-1.72) (3.37) (-0.57) (-0.69) 
      
Age -0.0314*** -0.0265** -0.0402*** -0.0403*** 0.0153 
 (-4.38) (-3.28) (-5.36) (-5.43) (1.32) 
      
Education 0.0480 0.0187 0.0445 0.0678 0.0274 
 (1.24) (0.43) (1.09) (1.67) (0.43) 
      
E_spouse -0.00273 -0.0254 -0.0224 -0.0501 0.132* 
 (-0.07) (-0.57) (-0.54) (-1.22) (2.08) 
      
E_father -0.0770 0.00148 -0.0390 -0.0190 0.0245 
 (-1.59) (0.03) (-0.75) (-0.37) (0.33) 
      
E_mother 0.0625 0.000179 0.0564 0.0360 -0.0568 
 (1.24) (0.00) (1.05) (0.68) (-0.75) 
      
E_spouse_father -0.0168 -0.0326 -0.0197 -0.0455 0.0430 
 (-0.33) (-0.56) (-0.37) (-0.85) (0.53) 
      
E_spouse_mothe
r 
-0.00196 0.00408 -0.0249 0.0245 -0.0716 
 (-0.04) (0.07) (-0.48) (0.47) (-0.87) 
      
Income 0.0000135 -0.00000622 0.0000298 0.0000229 -0.00000220 
 (1.01) (-0.47) (1.49) (1.23) (-0.14) 
      
one_child_dummy 0.107 0.0417 0.0696 0.257 0.251 
 (0.55) (0.20) (0.34) (1.25) (0.92) 
      
_cons 1.079 0.793 1.732** 1.826** -3.647*** 
 (1.78) (1.18) (2.73) (2.91) (-3.70) 
N 454 454 454 454 454 
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hypothesis that the development of social security eases the gender 
imbalance at birth. 
 
In Model 5, E_spouse is uniquely positive and significant. The better 
educated the child’s spouse, the more likely the parents are to use 
professional care services. This may be because educated spouses tend to 
work outside the home, rather than staying at home and taking care of 
parents-in-law.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper provides evidence about the possible cause of the problematic 
gender imbalance at birth in China. Much literature on this issue has 
proceeded to discussions based on the traditional assumption that Chinese 
sons are more involved in taking care of parents than Chinese daughters are, 
and thus, Chinese parents prefer sons. Yet, empirical evidence is lacking. 
This study first verified the assumption by using the “Preference Parameters 
Study in China 2011,” which conducted face-to-face interviews of randomly selected 
individuals in six major cities. More specifically, the study used target 
population samples aged 20-70 years old, married, and with at least one 
living parent. Second, discussions in the literature have led to the argument 
that decreasing child dependency by developing social security may ease the 
gender imbalance at birth. Thus, the study tested the validity of the 
argument, investigating the above-mentioned data.  
 
As a result, this paper first presents empirical evidence that Chinese sons 
(and their wives) are more likely, compared to daughters (and their 
husbands), to be primary caregivers for parents. The paper also reports the 
finding that parents’ dependency on their children would not necessarily 
decrease with the development of social security, although that may be the 
case when a child has a highly educated spouse. 
 
Although this study has obvious limitations in that the data were collected in 
six major cities only, the problematic nature of gender imbalance at birth and 
the lack of available empirical evidence demand that researchers begin to 
construct a better understanding of the causes and possible solutions to this 
troubling phenomenon. With that in mind, this paper contributes to that 
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construction of knowledge and insight.   
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